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Abstract —At SURA’s October 2014 workshop, entitled “Understanding and Modeling
Risk and Resilience in Complex Coastal Systems,” it was decided that a future workshop
to assess the benefits of collaboration among social and physical scientists should be
guided by a conceptual scenario applied to a specific coastal community. The following
scenario weaves complex engineering, environmental, and community resilience
elements into a story, which is coherent, systematic, comprehensive, and plausible. This
scenario has been developed to create integrated word pictures of how the future might
evolve in coastal Broward County, Florida. These images provide context for planning, a
proving ground for ideas, or the stimulus for new research and development. The
scenario-driven exercises may serve as a tool for improved decision making against a
background of possible future environments.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The purpose of this series of workshops is to identify ways that the understanding,
predictive modeling and management of risk and resilience of coastal communities can
be improved and facilitated by an interdisciplinary, multi-institutional collaborative
approach. The collaborative framework envisioned should incorporate physical, social,
organizational, economic, environmental, and engineering variables supported by
observations and is intended to engage scientists and decision makers from universities,
federal, state and local agencies, industry, NGOs and social justice advocacy groups. The
intent of the following fictional/hypothetical scenario is to ground discussions and
stimulate identification of the information, cyber infrastructure and model developments
needed to respond to both long and short-term coastal emergencies. The scenario
contains some pessimistic and some overly optimistic parts. We should seek strategies to
prevent or reduce the negative possibilities while making the more optimistic possibilities
future realities.
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2. Background: Long Range Planning, Budget Constraints, and Infrastructure
2.1
In the years leading
up to 2035, Broward
County’s infrastructure
was maintained and
enhanced to the extent that
budget constraints
allowed. As was the case
throughout Florida, the
county government relied
on intermittent funding
from Federal and State
sources and most of the
private sector offered little
assistance. An exception
The Greater Fort Lauderdale/Broward County Convention
was the hotel and
Center is a waterfront facility that has been built along the
insurance industries,
Intracoastal Waterway (Credit http://ftlauderdalecc.com/).
which acknowledged the
serious threats from rising seas and increased storminess. Congress provided just enough
funds for absolutely critical repairs, and left other infrastructure work to non-federal
sources and the tax revenue obtained from the Inland Waterways Trust Fund, itself now
stretched to cover federal infrastructure expenses other than waterways. Despite these
limitations of resources, Broward County endeavored to maintain a forward looking and
holistic approach to planning.
2.2
The most populous cities in 2015 remain so in 2035, however cities in Eastern
Broward can expect more growth than their Western counterparts. Fortunately,
enlightened county administrators heeded the predictions of increasingly sophisticated
numerical models. Those models predicted increased groundwater elevations and
decreased storm-water storage and discharge capacity as a result of accelerated sea level
rise and increased erosion and storm surge damage as a result of increased frequency and
intensity of tropical storms making Southeast Florida the most threatened coastal urban
center in the world. In anticipation of potential future disasters, Broward County and its
municipalities had already, by 2015, begun developing adaptation strategies and
“triaging” allocations of limited resources to protect the most vulnerable -and critical
public infrastructure. Included in infrastructure development by 2025 were improvements
in storm water drainage systems including installations of tide back-flow flaps on
outfalls, new pumps and an increase in land dedicated to surface water storage. In
accordance with conventional wisdom, prioritizations of resource allocations were guided
by traditional cost-benefit analyses. Those analyses suggested that, in 2015 assets worth
nearly $420B were in jeopardy in Miami and $5B in Broward County, assuming 2 feet of
sea level rise by 2030. These cost estimates do not include storm damage events, impacts
from loss of services or other indirect impacts to the economy.
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2.3
Prior to 2030,
waterfront and oceanfront
real estate property was
most valuable and was
precluded from ownership
by lower and middle class
income households. As
these low-lying vulnerable
areas were more
frequently flooded by
storms, eventually on a
daily basis by tides and
gradually over time
completely inundated by
sea level rise, wealthy
Port Everglades, Florida is one of the top three cruise
populations migrated to
ports in the world, is among the most active containerized
higher ground. Higher
cargo ports in the United States, and is an important
ground was located along
seaport for petroleum products such as gasoline and jet
the coastal ridge (an
fuel. (Credit http://www.porteverglades.net/).
ancient sand dune running
north to south) and within the central corridor of the county. As value of these higher
elevation properties escalated, low income families were forced to move into higher
density areas or to low-lying, flood-prone areas in the western part of the county adjacent
to the Everglades. The population of these areas nearly doubled between 2015 and 2035
as more low-income retirees, service-related hotel employees and Port Everglades
workers including many non-English-speaking immigrants, located there.
2.4
Affluent neighborhoods became increasingly inward-focused and isolated from
their less fortunate neighbors. Low lying communities needed improved drinking water
facilities, wastewater management plants, and storm sewers. Tragically, lack of funds
prevented all of the required infrastructure improvements from being extended to
outlying areas or to poor communities. Poor people suffered from unreliable water
systems that often promoted disease. Groundwater pumping and septic tanks dramatically
increased in the outer suburbs as communities refused to extend their infrastructure to
new housing developments. Water became an issue that often surfaced in local political
and statewide contests. Road maintenance had been significantly neglected and by 2025
many low-lying communities became cut off by flooded roads during “King Tides” and
increasingly recurrent storm surges. This created a growing impediment for effective and
timely hurricane evacuation.
3.

The Rising Threat

3.1
Over the period from 2015 to 2035, the average high tide had increased steadily,
but between 2030 and 2035 the rate of sea level rise increased at an average rate of
1.27″/year more or less as predicted by numerical models. In the year 2035, the mean sea
level in Southeast Florida was already more than a foot higher than it had been only a
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quarter of a century earlier. The rise in sea level was related in p art to the global rise in
average ocean surface elevation, in part to a slowing of the Gulf Stream and in part to
increased occurrences of strong onshore winds. When the highly predictable “King
Tides” of October were superimposed on the higher sea level, flooding of neighborhoods
prevailed and the effects
were greatly magnified
when tropical-storm force
onshore winds coincided
with the high water events.
On an almost annual basis
after 2025 street flooding of
low-lying neighborhoods
paralyzed traffic, sewers
were flooded, drinking
water was contaminated and
water-borne pathogens were
spread throughout lowincome neighborhoods.
3.2
Also, after a
The historic Stranahan House in Fort Lauderdale is sited
comparative lull of a
along the New River which originates in the Everglades
decade, tropical storms and
and flows east (Credit Environmental Protection and
hurricanes resumed their
Growth Management Department, Broward County).
assault on Southeast Florida
beginning in 2017. Over the period 2020 to 2035, Florida was impacted by 75 named
storms. Of these, 11 were hurricanes of Category 3 or greater. The toll enacted by these
storms on Broward County, particularly on the poorer neighborhoods was cumulative and
devastating. In early July 2028, Category 5 “Hurricane Etienne made landfall just south
of Homestead Florida. Fortunately, forecasts by the National Hurricane Center (NHC)
had begun over a week before the storm’s arrival. The forecasts were accurate and were
heeded and all vulnerable residents had been safely evacuated prior to landfall. But the
aftermath was catastrophic: over half of the county’s homes were destroyed by storm
surge flooding and wind damage, the capacity of storm water control systems was
exceeded, the entrance to Port Everglades was filled with sand and rubble, and the lower
floors and lobbies of high-end hotels were flooded. Thankfully, because of greatly
improved computer forecasts, and the wisdom of emergency managers, there was no loss
of life. But the worst was still to come.
4. Emergency Management 2035: Preparing for Hurricane Yvonne
4.1
In the years following Hurricane Etienne there were numerous named storms that
crossed the Atlantic toward Florida or formed over the warm waters of the Caribbean or
Gulf of Mexico. Fortunately for Southeast Florida, the few storms that made direct
landfall there between 2028 and 2035 were either tropical storms or Category 1
Hurricanes. In contrast to the trend that had prevailed prior to 2010, the strongest storms
tended to turn northward well to the east of Florida and track up the coast ultimately
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striking the coasts of the Mid Atlantic states including New York Bight and, on occasion,
New England. Others intensified over the hot waters of the Gulf of Mexico impacting
West Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. The seven years of low storm
activity in Southeast Florida allowed Miami-Dade and Broward Counties to make muchneeded repairs to infrastructure and allowed many homes and businesses to be rebuilt.
However, many of those repairs were still underway by late summer 2035 when
Southeast Florida was hit by a rapid succession of two tropical storms and Category 2
Hurricane Ursula. With no further disruptions, recovery from those events would have
required several months to a year.
4.2
Throughout most of the Northern Hemisphere, the summer of 2035 lingered well
beyond the beginning of autumn. Early in the second week of October, hot Saharan winds
carried an “easterly wave” off the west coast of Africa and out over the warm waters of
the tropical Atlantic Ocean. Within a day, an incipient low pressure system had
developed and was moving steadily westward. Shortly after passing over the Cape Verde
Islands on its westerly track, the system was labeled a “tropical disturbance” by the
National Hurricane Center. Two days later, the NHC issued maritime warnings for
“Tropical Storm Yvonne”. As the system progressed along its westward course, it
continued to develop: it was classified a Category 1 Hurricane on October 20 and Cat 2
on October 22. A Hurricane watch was issued by NHC for the Lesser Antilles on
October 23 but hours later, in accordance with forecasts, the system took an abrupt turn
to the north, then back to the northwest. By October 25 it was clear that Hurricane
Yvonne, now a Category 3 storm with a growing diameter, had a high probability of
making landfall somewhere along the coast of Southeast Florida. The NHC issued the
appropriate warnings immediately. In the thirty years since Hurricane Katrina devastated
the city of New Orleans, the uncertainties inherent in numerical predictions had been
reduced substantially, and forecasts were now widely trusted by public officials as well as
the general public. There was little dithering as all in the storm’s path prepared for the
worst.
4.3
At 10 AM on the morning of October 26, 2035, NHC upgraded Hurricane
Yvonne, which was now centered about 400 miles north of the Dominican Republic, to
Category 4. Further intensification was expected prior to landfall and the size of the
storm had also increased: hurricane force winds now extended outward 120 miles from
the center. The precise point of landfall had become irrelevant. Evacuations were
underway in Monroe, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Southbound
lanes on Interstate 95 and Florida’s Turnpike were closed to southbound traffic and
opened as northbound evacuation corridors. Emergency responders, the National Guard,
Coast Guard and Florida State Police were placed on alert. By early afternoon on the 26th,
most affluent residents had already departed for higher ground in their private cars but
many low-income people remained behind, waiting to be picked up by emergency buses
or friends. For many, neither would come.
4.4
As Yvonne continued its advance toward the Bahamas and Florida, multiinstitutional teams of numerical modelers from NOAA, the Navy, Department of
Homeland Security, the Netherlands and U.S., Australian and European Universities
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worked together feverishly in a virtual cyber domain trying to predict the course and
consequences of the storm. These efforts were appropriately under the auspices of
NOAA’s National Hurricane Center, which had the final authority for issuing forecasts.
The ensemble of results from a suite of models converged with little scatter or uncertainty
on a path that carried Yvonne to the north of Andros Island, across the Gulf Stream,
where some intensification was predicted, with landfall expected somewhere between
Homestead and Palm Beach on the evening of October 27 or early morning of October
28. The wind-field output from the atmospheric models was immediately used as input to
ocean process models that predicted current, wave and storm surge characteristics
generated by the storm. Following the wave model predictions, swell forerunners of the
wind-generated waves were already arriving on Ft. Lauderdale Beach by late afternoon
on the 26th with heights of 8 to 10 feet. Breaker heights were forecast to reach 30 ft over
the next 24-36 hours and cause massive beach erosion along with overtopping of
breakwaters and roads. Most ominous of all, however, the recently refined storm-surge
model, ADCIRC IV, was predicting storm surge heights of 30 feet or more above normal
tidal elevations to prevail shortly prior to landfall of Yvonne, which was upgraded to
Category 5 by noon on October 27. And routine astronomical tide tables predicted a high
“King Tide” to occur at 11:15 PM on October 27. Catastrophic inundation, overprinted
by severe wave and wind damage now appeared imminent for Miami-Dade and Broward
Counties.
4.5
Thirty years before
Yvonne, as Hurricane Katrina
bore down on New Orleans in
2005, numerical models, verified
by wave moorings in the Gulf of
Mexico, were predicting high
storm surges for Coastal
Louisiana. Those predictions
were readily accessible in real
time on the World Wide Web in
the form of color-coded
animations and numerical data,
but they were largely ignored by
Hurricane Katrina nearing the Gulf Coast on August
local, State and Federal leaders
28, 2005 (Credit National Oceanic and Atmospheric
as well as by most emergency
managers. In 2035, the story was Administration).
entirely different. Models had proven their reliability over and over in real-world storm
events and had undergone rigorous testing, inter comparisons and refinements by way of
a long series of testbed programs. Few, if any, responsible leaders in 2035 would have
ignored the forecasts rendered by those models. So when Florida’s Governor was briefed
on the forecasts on the evening of October 26, more than 24 hours before the storm was
expected to reach Florida, she contacted the President of the United States and asked that
a state of emergency be declared for South Florida. The President was initially reluctant
but eventually agreed. Soon after sunup on the 27th, FEMA convoys carrying emergency
supplies, food, water and temporary housing were headed for high-ground staging areas

8

in central Florida. Two naval amphibious ships carrying helicopters, long-haul
communications, and engineering equipment for deployment in rescues were underway
from Norfolk Naval Base in the hope of being on site as soon as possible after Yvonne
crossed the southern end of the Florida peninsula into the Gulf of Mexico. Coast Guard
vessels were also en route.
4.6
Resilience assessments conducted by Broward County were instrumental to
disaster preparedness for Yvonne. Findings during resilience assessments contributed to
the planning of effective humanitarian assistance by interagency partners by helping to
identify the most vulnerable communities, environments, and facilities. The development
of realistic scenarios for Broward County benefitted from integrated approaches where
researchers from the natural and social sciences have worked together with a diversity of
stakeholders and managers. Programs initiated during 2015 helped to overcome gaps
between knowledge production on the one hand and the demand for knowledge to
contribute to the solution of social problems, on the other. For example, efforts since
2015 were focused on the integration of physical and social models to understand
parameters on the same spatial and temporal scales. Information from ADCIRC IV was
used with urban models to support search and rescue, selecting parking areas for
emergency vehicles, supply distribution points, favorable sites for temporary food and
medical services, sites for sanitation facilities, and debris clearance. Information from
ADCIRC IV with ecological models and imagery were useful to assess the degree of
degradation and likely responses of ecosystems to storms since 2015.
5. Emergency Management 2035: The Aftermath of Hurricane Yvonne
5.1
Broward County has
become more vulnerable due to
usual urban issues and the
additional pressure of natural
hazards such as an increased
occurrence of tropical cyclones.
Increasing numbers of people are
now living in low-lying lands that
were once unoccupied because
they are flood prone. Such factors
stress facilities, ecosystems, and
communities and weaken
Coastal Resilience (Credit Dr. Julie Rosati,
resilience. The response to the
USACE, August 26, 2014).
aftermath of Hurricane Yvonne
exposed the weakness of existing emergency management and response policies on all
levels - local, state, and federal.
5.2
Much progress has been made since 2015, but it is only through review of the
underlying problems of the current policies and practices that continued progress will
occur. Resilience approaches in Broward County focuses on five dimensions – physical,
social, economic, institutional, and natural. Resilience assessments that include
9

multidisciplinary discussions on global and uncertain threats can help advance the ability
of Broward County to bounce back from disasters.
5.3
The focus on improvements is at the local level since local governments and
institutions are first respondents and geographically close to the affected community.
Local universities are sought to play a leadership role to advance resilience in Broward
County by learning from disasters and teaching and advancing the lessons learned.
6. Meeting the Challenges Identified in the Foregoing Scenario: Some Questions
6.1
The relatively gloomy demographic and infrastructural developments portrayed in
Section 2 of the scenario just described are not inevitable. What kinds of data, model
predictions, management policies and governmental investment strategies might have
prevented the rather dire circumstances faced by low income residents of Broward
County in the Year 2035? Consider the possible needs for predicting “street by street”
flooding probabilities utilizing detailed topographic data and projected sea level rise as
well model predictions of future demographics. What are some human health
considerations such as the feasibility of immunizations against water-borne diseases?
What kind of protective structures such as sea walls or dikes might have helped had the
“triaged” allocation of limited resources been more favorable to low income
communities? What are some of the ways that the academic community can assist
governmental agencies at local, state and federal levels in making long-range plans that
serve all residents?
6.2
The 4th paragraph of Section 4 describes a high level of collaboration within a
diverse cyber-enabled international team of academic and governmental modelers. That
facet of this scenario is highly optimistic and promising. Sadly, it would be unlikely in
2015 or within the next few years for reasons discussed at length in the first workshop in
October 2014. Most of those reasons are more related to the cultures of universities and
government agencies than to science and technology. But it is entirely feasible for such
advanced collaboration to happen within the next decade and this would probably save
countless lives and alleviate the suffering of millions of people. Some questions to
consider: How can integration of knowledge, tools and ways of thinking from several
disciplines and across contrasting administrative entities (e.g., agencies, countries,
universities) be more effectively facilitated? What are the primary impediments to such
collaboration and how can they be overcome? What advances in cyber tools for rapid
skill assessment and inter comparison of models are needed before the 2035 modeling
scenario described can be realized? What advances (if any) in high performance
computing capabilities are still needed to enable the virtual cyber domain imagined in
Section 4, paragraph 4?

10

6.3
Another very
optimistic- and
presently unrealisticpart of the above
scenario is the
complete trust of
science-based model
predictions by
emergency managers
and leaders at all
governmental levels.
In 2015, scientific
projections are widely
denied by many
Coastal vulnerability to Sea Level Rise (Credit U.S. Geological
politicians and
Survey - Woods Hole Coastal and Marine Science Center).
decision makers. The
enlightenment envisioned in this scenario must be nurtured by the scientific community
at large. This will require careful and well-articulated, non-jargonized communication
over a prolonged period combined with clear demonstrations- over and over and over that the models really work and are not “hocus pocus”. This may be the largest challenge
of all. So the question is: How do we do that?
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